Stochastic cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer decentralized supply channel by unknown
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Stochastic cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer
decentralized supply channel
Peter E. Ezimadu1 • Chukwuma R. Nwozo2
Received: 28 May 2015 / Accepted: 20 July 2016 / Published online: 1 August 2016
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This work considers cooperative advertising in a
manufacturer–retailer supply chain. While the manufac-
turer is the Stackelberg leader, the retailer is the follower.
Using Sethi model it models the dynamic effect of the
manufacturer and retailer’s advertising efforts on sale. It
uses optimal control technique and stochastic differential
game theory to obtain the players’ advertising strategies
and the long-run value of the awareness share. Further, it
models the relationship between the payoffs of both players
and the awareness share. The work shows that with the
provision of subsidy the retail advertising effort increases
while the manufacturer’s advertising effort reduces. It
further shows that the total channel payoff is higher for
subsidised retail advertising. However, the subsidy can
only be possible if the rate of growth of the manufacturer’s
payoff is twice higher than that of the retailer.
Keywords Supply chain  Cooperative advertising 
Stochastic differential game  Subsidy  Sethi model 
Optimal control
Introduction
Studies have shown that in non-cooperative relationships,
the leader has manipulative power to control the follower.
Having estimated the follower based on the available
information and deduced his possible reactions, the leader
then decides the first move (moves first), and then pre-
scribes the behaviour of the follower (Yue et al. 2006).
Since the manufacturer has the capacity to control the
channel in a traditional setting, he acts as the channel
leader in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain.
First we distinguish between local and national adver-
tising since this will aid our understanding of cooperative
advertising. The aim of local advertising is to induce short-
term purchase through the local media. National advertis-
ing aims at building a long-term image for the company or
for some of its major products (Young and Greyser 1983;
Houk 1995). Local advertising is often price oriented
because its goal is to ensure immediate purchase. The
emphasis on national advertising is to create more
favourable product attitudes. There is a significant differ-
ence between the costs of both types of advertising. This is
because the retailer’s means of advertising is the local
media which operates at lower costs. He also has better
local market information. Thus the importance of both
types of advertising cannot be over emphasized because of
their distinct and significant roles. Cooperative advertising
is an arrangement where the manufacturer bears some or all
the costs of local advertising incurred by the retailer for
good(s) produced by the manufacturer.
The cooperative advertising literature can be catego-
rized into three groups: static, dynamic and stochastic
models. Berger (1972) was the first to consider static model
on cooperative advertising as discount given by the man-
ufacturer to the retailer as an advertising allowance. Dant
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and Berger (1996) extended the Berger model to include
cooperative advertising decision in franchising systems
where demand is uncertain and both channel members
differ on their expected sales. Huang et al. (2002) argued
that embarking on static examination of cooperative
advertising is justified since promotion effects do not last
long compared to advertising, and is primarily a driver of
short term sales. However, empirical results in Naik et al.
(2005), Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1994) and Fruchter
and Kalish (1998) suggest that dynamic models are supe-
rior in examining cooperative advertising.
By considering the manufacturer as the Stackelberg
leader in an extended Nerlove and Arrow (1962) frame-
work, Jørgensen et al. (2000) employed Stackelberg dif-
ferential game to model the relationship between the
manufacturer and the retailer in a dynamic setting. For
more references on dynamic cooperative differential game
see Karray and Zaccour (2005), Jørgensen et al. (2003) and
He et al. (2011).
He et al. (2009) considered a manufacturer–retailer
Stackelberg game on cooperative advertising using the
stochastic model proposed by Sethi (1983). Specifically,
only the retailer is involved in advertising with advertising
support in the form of subsidy from the manufacturer.
Other recent works on cooperative advertising include He
et al. (2014), Aust (2015) and Giri et al. (2015).
This work extends He et al. (2009) by considering the
direct involvement of the manufacturer in cooperative
advertising. Thus while the retailer is involved in local
advertising, the manufacturer subsidises retail advertising
and engages in national advertising.
As we will observe later, part of the interest of this work
is to consider the performance of the supply chain. Supply
chain is a system of manufacturer(s) and retailer(s) in-
volved in the movement of goods and/or services from the
producer to the consumer. Recently supply chain witnessed
a number of contributions in advertising and related fields.
Taleizadeh and Charmchi (2015) studied a two-echelon
supply chain consisting of one manufacturer (the Stackel-
berg leader) and one retailer (the Stackelberg follower)
with two complementary goods. They showed that manu-
facturer’s and retailer’s profits decrease when the com-
plementary degree between two products is large. In
analysing the pricing decisions of the members of a supply
chain for complementary and substitute products with
different market powers, Esmaeilzadeh and Taleizadeh
(2016) considered hierarchical relationship where the
manufacturers are the Stackelberg leaders and the retailers
are the followers. Heydari and Norouzinasab (2015) stud-
ied a two-level discounted model for coordinating a
decentralized supply chain. They showed that the proposed
two-level discount policy is suitable for coordinating the
channel. Using game theory Esmaeili et al. (2015) modeled
the conflicts between countries and their common resour-
ces. Also Mahmoudi et al. (2014) used game theory to
propose a model that will be useful to the government in
determining optimal taxes and subsidies. To create more
valuable manufacturing and business operations, Golriz-
gashti (2014) developed a balanced approach which is
helpful in measuring supply chain performance. Additional
works on supply chain include Kumar et al. (2013) and Rao
et al. (2013).
Model formulation
As regards advertising expenditures, studies in the litera-
ture can be categorized into two. There are those that do
not differentiate between the manufacturer’s advertising
expenditure and retailer’s advertising expenditure in the
determination of the value of the payoff function (Berger
1972; Little 1979; Tull et al. 1986; Dant and Berger 1996;
He et al. 2009, 2011). The other category distinguishes
between both types of advertising. Their argument is that
both types of advertising expenditures can influence sales
and eventually the payoff functions differently, and as such
should be assessed differently (Jørgensen et al. 2000;
Huang et al. 2002). We align with the school of thought
that views both types as distinct.
To increase the awareness share (which eventually leads
to the sale of the manufacturer’s product), the retailer
decides the local advertising effort aR tð Þ, while the man-
ufacturer decides the national advertising effort aM tð Þ and
retail advertising participation rate k tð Þ.
In the literature it is common to assume a quadratic cost
function (Deal 1979; Chintagunta and Jain 1992; Jørgensen
et al. 2000; Prasad and Sethi 2004; He et al. 2009, 2011).
This implies increasing marginal cost of advertising.
Towing this line, we let the cost of advertising to be
quadratic in the manufacturer and retailer’s advertising
efforts aM tð Þ and aR tð Þ respectively. Thus kaR tð Þ2þaM tð Þ2
and 1  kð ÞaR tð Þ2 represent the manufacturer and retailer’s
advertising expenditures respectively.
Dynamics of the awareness share
To model the dynamic effect of advertising on sales we
shall use the Sethi advertising model (Sethi 1983).
dy tð Þ ¼ baðtÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1  y tð Þ
p
 ky tð Þ
h i
dt þ r y tð Þð Þdz tð Þ
y 0ð Þ ¼ y0 2 0; 1½ ; t 0;
ð1Þ
where a tð Þ is the advertising effort, y tð Þ is the market share,
y is the initial condition, b is the advertising effectiveness
parameter, k is the decay parameter. It is a modification of
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the Vidale–Wolfe advertising model (Vidale and Wolfe
1957). Different forms of this model have been considered.
The model and its competitive extensions have been
broadly used in the literature (Sorger 1989; Chintagunta
and Vilcassim 1992; Chintagunta and Jain 1995; Prasad
and Sethi 2004; Bass et al. 2005; Naik et al. 2008; Erickson
2009; Prasad and Sethi 2009; Erickson 2009; He et al.
2009), and some of these extensions have also been vali-
dadted empirically (Chintagunta and Vilcassim 1992;
Chintagunta and Jain 1995; Naik et al. 2008; Erickson
2009), thus ensuring its applicability. This model is given
by
dy tð Þ ¼ a aR tð Þ þ aM tð Þð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1  y tð Þ
p
 ky tð Þ
h i
dt þ r y tð Þð Þdz tð Þ
y 0ð Þ ¼ y0 2 0; 1½ ; t 0;
ð2Þ
where y tð Þ is the awareness share representing the fraction
of the market aware of the product. y0 is the initial pro-
portion of the market aware of the product, a is the
response constant. It measures the advertising effective-
ness. Thus a 2 0; 1½ . k is the decay constant. It measures
the rate at which potential consumers are lost due to
background competition, forgetfulness, product obsolesce
and so on. r y tð Þð Þ represents a variance term and z tð Þ,
represents a standard Wiener process on the underlying
probability space X;=; Pð Þ. aR tð Þ and aM tð Þ 0 are non-
anticipative with respect to the Wiener process z tð Þ. These
are stochastic processes.
Considering (2) we see that the awareness share
dynamics is affected linearly by both the retail advertising
effort aR tð Þ of the retailer and the national advertising
effort aM tð Þ of the manufacturer. These are respectively,
the square roots of the retail advertising expenditure aR tð Þ2
and manufacturer’s advertising expenditure aM tð Þ2. Thus
they are concave functions for the advertising expenditures.
Both local and national advertising efforts focus on the
fraction of the population of end-users (consumers) who
are unaware of the product.
Despite the stochastic disturbances the awareness share
is bounded between 0 and 1 with the assumption that the
function r : ð0; 1Þ ! R is continuous and Lipschitz on
every subinterval of (0,1), and a tð Þ; aM tð Þ 0 and
r 0ð Þ ¼ r 1ð Þ ¼ 0. This gives a strictly positive drift when
the awareness share is 0 and a strictly negative drift when it
is 1. Then the solutions of (2) have 0 and 1 as natural
boundaries (Gihman and Skorohod 1972), with
y 0ð Þ ¼ y0 2 ½0; 1, that is y tð Þ 2 0; 1ð Þ almost surely.
We observe that (2) is an extension of (1) with the
introduction of the manufacturer’s advertising effort aM tð Þ.
Based on this extension we will compare the effect of
subsidy on the local advertising effort aR tð Þ and national
advertising effort aM tð Þ, and the resulting effect on the
awareness share and the players’ payoffs. Further we will
compare channel performances for subsidised and unsub-
sidised retail advertising.
Before proceeding further, it is pertinent to note that in
this work we restrict our attention to feedback Stackelberg
solutions where the optimal policy, in general, depends on
the current state and time (Basar and Olsder 1999; He et al.
2009, 2011).
The sequence of events in the leader–follower
relationship model
The events in this game will evolve as follows. The man-
ufacturer takes the first step by unveiling his feedback
national advertising effort aM yð Þ 0 and the feedback
participation rate k yð Þ 2 0; 1½  on retail advertising.
In reaction to the manufacturer’s declarations, the
retailer then decides the advertising effort aR tð Þ. This is
achieved by solving the optimal control problem
VR yð Þ ¼ max











subject to (2), where E is the expectation operator; g is the
discount rate and m is the retailer’s margin. The optimal
value of the retailer’s discounted total profit VR yð Þ depends
only on the initial value y0 at time t ¼ 0: In anticipation of
the retailer’s reaction the manufacturer incorporates same
(the retailer’s reactions) into his control problem, and
solves for his national advertising effort aM yð Þ and par-
ticipation rate k yð Þ. Thus we have that
VM yð Þ ¼ max
aM tð Þ 0;











dy tð Þ ¼ a aR y tð Þjk tð Þ; aM tð Þð Þ þ aM tð Þð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1  y tð Þ
p
 kx tð Þ
h i
dt
þ r y tð Þð Þdz tð Þ
y 0ð Þ ¼ y0 2 0; 1½ ; t 0:
ð5Þ
The players’ advertising strategies and subsidy
First we solve the optimal control problems (2)–(5) for the
retailer’s best response to the manufacturer’s policy, the
manufacturer’s advertising and subsidy decisions.
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Theorem 3.1 Given the manufacturer’s advertising effort
aM and participation rate k, then the retail advertising
effort is given by




2 1  k yð Þð Þ ; ð6Þ
while the manufacturer’s advertising effort is given by












Proof The proof is in ‘‘Appendix 1’’.
Observe from (6) and (7) that the advertising efforts aR
and aM depend on the level of awareness y. That is, in
course of advertising, the players consider the fraction of
the market that is aware of the product. This is because the
aim of advertising is to gain a good fraction of the market.
Thus it is proper for the efforts to be functions of those who
are aware of the product.
Now, considering the term 2 1  k yð Þð Þ we observe that
the subsidy from the manufacturer must be constrained to be
k yð Þ 2 0; 1½ Þ. This is because by letting k yð Þ ¼ 1, aR will
become unbounded. This is not ideal since it is not possible
for the retailer to spend such an extremely large sum on
advertising. Thus knowing that the retailer will not want to
spend such a very large sum on advertising, it would be
unwise for the manufacturer to completely subsidize retail
advertising. Hence, the idea of subsidizing only a fraction is
quite ideal. Further we note that by engaging in national
advertising and complete subsidisation of retail advertising
effort the manufacturer bears the burden of the entire supply
chain. This is not healthy for the chain.
Further it is pertinent to note that the presence of VRy and
VMy in (6) and (7) mean that the players expend efforts in
proportion to the rate at which their individual payoffs are
growing. Thus as the payoffs increase the advertising
efforts also increase.
Finally (8) shows that the provision of subsidy can only
be possible if the rate of increase of the manufacturer’s
payoff is twice greater than the rate of increase of the
retailer’s payoff.
The retailer and manufacturer’s advertising
policies and payoff when no subsidy is provided
Now, there are two types of equilibria. The first considers
the situation where the manufacturer does not provide any
subsidy for retailer advertising. We call this the no
cooperative equilibrium. In the second case, the manufac-
turer subsidises retail advertising. This is called a cooper-
ative equilibrium. We state these in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2
respectively
Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium for unsubsidised
retail advertising
Theorem 4.1 Suppose the retail advertising effort is
unsubsidized so that k ¼ 0, then there is a unique feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium ðaR; aMÞ given by












with the value functions given by
VR yð Þ ¼ HR þ GRy; ð11Þ
VM yð Þ ¼ HM þ GMy; ð12Þ
and the condition for the manufacturer not to provide
any subsidy to support the retail advertising effort, is that
2GM GR, where
GR ¼ 4MR
4 k þ gð Þ þ a2ðGR þ 2GMÞ ; ð13Þ
GM ¼ 4MM








2GR þ GM½ : ð16Þ
Proof The proof is in ‘‘Appendix 2’’.
VR yð Þ is the value function of the retailer. (11) shows
that it gives the payoff for a given fraction of the market y.
Note that GR is the rate at which this value function
(payoff) is growing. It therefore follows that the retailer’s
focus will be on how to improve on GR: Looking at (13) we
observe that this can be done in three ways. First, by
improving on his margin, the quantity in (13) will certainly
increase. Thus by increasing his margin MR, he is in a good
position to increase the rate of growth of his value function.
Secondly, by being foresighted he will tend to reduce his
discount rate to the lowest possible value. Thirdly, is to
work towards ensuring that the decay rate is also as small
as possible. The rate of forgetfulness can be reduced by
employing methods that ensure that the knowledge of the
need and importance of the product remain indelible in the
mind of the consumer. This same explanation also goes for
the manufacturer’s payoff.
4 J Ind Eng Int (2017) 13:1–12
123
From (15) and (16) we observe that HR and HM depend
much on the advertising effectiveness and discount rate. By
being foresighted and with a higher advertising effective-
ness, these quantities will increase.
Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium for subsidised
retail advertising
Theorem 4.2 Suppose the retail advertising effort is
subsidized so that k[ 0, then there is a unique feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium ðaR; aM; kÞ given by
aR yð Þ ¼











k ¼ 2GM  GR
2GM þ GR ; ð19Þ
with the value functions given by
VR yð Þ ¼ HR þ GRy; ð20Þ
VM yð Þ ¼ HM þ GMy; ð21Þ
where
GR ¼ 8MRa2 6GM þ GRð Þ þ 8 k þ gð Þ ; ð22Þ
GM ¼ 16MM  a
2G2R
4 a2 2GM þ GRð Þ þ 4 k þ gð Þð Þ ; ð23Þ
HR ¼ a








Proof Proof is in ‘‘Appendix 3’’.
As in the unsubsidized case, GMand GR can be
improved on by increasing the margins, being foresighted,
reducing the rate of forgetfulness and improving on the
advertising effectiveness. Further, similar explanations go
for HR and HM as explained in the unsubsidized case. We
observe that the provision of subsidy has effect on retail
advertising. This is obvious with the presence of GM in (17)
which is not present in the unsubsidized case (9). This
shows that the retail advertising is not only influenced by
the rate of growth of the payoff of the retailer, but also by
the subsidy from the manufacturer. Thus as the manufac-
turer’s payoff increases, the subsidy to the retailer increa-
ses, and the retail advertising effort also increases.
From (19) we have that
k ¼ 2GM  GR
2GM þ GR :
This means that for k to be positive, 2GM[GR:
Comparing the advertising efforts for subsidized
and unsubsidized retail advertising
We shall let k ¼ 0ð Þ and k[ 0ð Þ to be used as subscript
and superscript to denote situation not involving subsidy
and situation involving subsidy, respectively. It is pertinent
to note that the retailer will accept subsidy from the
manufacturer only if it will lead to an increase in his payoff
or at worst let the payoff remain unchanged. As such we
have that
VR k[ 0ð Þ yð ÞVR k¼0ð Þ yð Þ;
so that
HR k[ 0ð Þ þ GR k[ 0ð ÞyHR k¼0ð Þ þ GR k¼0ð Þy:
We also observe that with subsidy the rate of increase of
the retailer’s value function must be greater than his rate of
increase without subsidy. At worst they must be equal.
That is
GR k[ 0ð Þ GR k¼0ð Þ: ð26Þ
With subsidy much of the advertising burden is lifted
from the manufacturer. Thus the manufacturer is no
longer obliged to maintain the same level of advertis-
ing. Since increasing the manufacturer’s advertising
effort aM implies increasing the rate of increase of the
payoff GM , having provided subsidy leading to reduc-
tion in aM , it equally follows that GM will reduce. Thus
we have that
GM k¼0ð Þ GM k[ 0ð Þ: ð27Þ
However, we must have that
VM k[ 0ð Þ VM k¼0ð Þ;
else it is not worth subsidizing retail advertising.
We now consider the relationship between the adver-
tising efforts for situations where retail advertising is
subsidized and where it is not. Now, from (17) and (9) we
have that
aR k[ 0ð ÞðyÞ
aR k¼0ð ÞðyÞ
¼










Merging (26) with the fact that with subsidy
2GM k[ 0ð Þ[GR k[ 0ð Þ we have that
2GM k[ 0ð Þ[GR k[ 0ð Þ GR k¼0ð Þ:
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Since
GR k[ 0ð Þ GR k¼0ð Þ;
we have that
2GM k[ 0ð Þ þ GR k[ 0ð Þ[ 2GR k¼0ð Þ
) aR k[ 0ð ÞðyÞ
aR k¼0ð ÞðyÞ




) aR k[ 0ð Þ yð Þ[ aR k¼0ð Þ yð Þ:
Further from (10) and (18) we have that
aM k[ 0ð ÞðyÞ
aM k¼0ð ÞðyÞ
¼








¼ GM k[ 0ð Þ
GM k¼0ð Þ
;
which from (27) leads to
GM k[ 0ð Þ
GM k¼0ð Þ
 1 ) aM k[ 0ð Þ yð Þ aM k¼0ð Þ yð Þ:
From these we infer that while the subsidy from the
manufacturer is enough motivation for the retailer to
increase his advertising effort, his advertising effort is
consequently reduced. Thus we conclude that:
Theorem 5.1
(i) The subsidized retail advertising effort is higher
than the unsubsidized.
(ii) The manufacturer’s participation in retail adver-
tising leads to a reduced manufacturer’s advertis-
ing effort.
The evolution process of the awareness share
It is necessary to specify the disturbance function so that
the evolution process of the awareness share can be char-
acterized. According to Prasad and Sethi (2004) and He
et al. (2009) the disturbance function





characterizes the evolution process of the awareness share.
This is because it ensures that y bounded between 0 and 1
irrespective of the stochastic disturbances.
Let y tð Þ; t 0f g be one-dimensional for the Ito process
given the stochastic differential equation
dy tð Þ ¼ l y tð Þ; tð Þdt þ l y tð Þ; tð Þdz tð Þ; y 0ð Þ ¼ y0: ð29Þ
Observe that y tð Þ is a Markov process (Cyganowski
et al. 2002; He et al. 2011). In moving from awareness
share u at time 0 to awareness share y at time t[ 0, the




P 0; u; t; xð Þ ¼  o
ou





l y tð Þ; tð Þð Þ2P 0; u; t; yð Þ
	 

P 0; u; t; yð Þ ¼ d u yð Þ:
Using (9) and (10) in (2) we have that
dy tð Þ ¼ a
2
2
GR þ GMð Þ  a
2
2







y 1  yð Þ
p
dz tð Þ
y 0ð Þ ¼ y0; t 0:
ð30Þ







GR þ GMð Þ  a
2
2










r2u 1  uð ÞP 
¼ 0:
Simplifying this and letting P ¼ f uð Þ for its density so
that oPot ¼ 0, and then multiplying through by 2r2 we have the
hypergeometric equation

















 2  2
a2
2

















The solution of this equation is















r2 1  uð Þ2kr
2
r2 : ð31Þ
Observe that the long-run equilibrium awareness share
is
y k¼0ð Þ ¼
a2 GR þ GMð Þ
a2 GR þ GMð Þ þ 2k : ð32Þ
Also putting (17) and (18) into (2) we have
dy tð Þ ¼ a
2
4
4GM þ GRð Þ  a
2
4
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Substituting the term in the square bracket in (33) for that in
the square bracket in (30) and proceeding as above, we have that
f uð Þ ¼
C a
2














and the long-run awareness share is given by
y k[ 0ð Þ ¼ a
2ð4GR þ GMÞ
a2 4GR þ GMð Þ þ 2k : ð35Þ
From the discussions above we have the following
results:
Theorem 6.1
(i) Suppose the manufacturer does not subsidise retail
advertising, then the stationary distribution of
awareness share is given by (31) and the long-
run awareness share is given by (32)
(ii) Suppose the manufacturer subsidises retail adver-
tising, then the stationary distribution of awareness
share is given by (34) and the long-run awareness
share is given by (35)
Numerical results and discussion
Choice of parameter values
Observe that a 2 0; 1½  reflect the effect of advertising on sale.
We set it at 0.6. In our model the finite decay term which
originated from Vidale and Wolfe (1957) and the positive
discount rate can be adjusted to capture how important the
present is with respect to the future. If the discount rate is high,
then the firm effectively behaves like a myopic firm, and if it is
low, like a foresighted firm. Thus, setting these two parameters
high will make our work look like a static analysis. However,
their being in the work helps us to explain dynamic implica-
tions. It is obvious that amust be greater than k if advertising is
to yield any positive result. If the rate of effectiveness is lower
than that of decay, then it will be futile effort advertising. In
consonance with the view that advertising is effective enough,
k is set low enough. Thus we have that a[ k ¼ 0:2. Since the
game is played on an infinite horizon, and our firm is fore-
sighted the discount rate is set very low. We take this to be
g ¼ 0:05. Next we consider the players’ profit margins per
item sold. We take MR ¼ 45 and MM ¼ 50.
Effect of subsidy on the players’ advertising efforts
We observe from Figs. 1 and 3 that without subsidy the
manufacturer advertises more than the retailer. But with the
provision of subsidy the order changed. We infer that with
additional spending through subsidy, the manufacturer opts
out of aggressive advertising to reduce expenditure. Thus
subsidy is not out of place because the retailer is closer to
the consumers. Also the channel effort is higher with
subsidy as shown in Figs. 2 and 4.
Comparison of the awareness shares for subsidised
and unsubsidised retail advertising
The primary purpose of advertising is to increase demand.
This is achieved with increase in the market share. From
Fig. 5 we observe that with subsidy, the awareness is
higher. This results from aggressive retail advertising
approach as can be seen in (17) when compared with (9).
Looking at (32) we observe the effect of subsidy in (35) as
shown in Fig. 5.
The effect of subsidy on payoffs
Let us now consider the effect of subsidy on players’
payoffs. From (20) and (21) it is clear that the increase in
the awareness share resulting from subsidy affects the
players’ payoffs. This is clear from Figs. 6 and 8. We also
observe that the individual increase in the payoffs subse-
quently increases the channel payoff. Thus with subsidy the
channel performs better. These are clear in Figs. 7 and 9
Conclusion remarks
The central aim of this work is to develop and use coop-
erative advertising models to consider the effect of subsidy
on the players’ advertising efforts; to consider the effect of
these efforts on the awareness share, and then, the payoffs.
These were achieved in this work.
Fig. 1 A comparison of the players’ advertising efforts using the
awareness share
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Unlike a lot of works in the literature which consider
cases where only one of the players (particularly the
retailer) is directly involved in advertising, this work
incorporates the manufacturer’s national advertising into
Sethi model. It then considered a situation where both
players are involved in advertising, with the manufacturer
involved in national advertising and the retailer in local
advertising. We identified two types of equilibria. While
one centred on unsubsidised retail advertising effort, the
other majored on subsidized advertising. We obtained
results which established how the advertising efforts affect
the payoffs through the awareness share. The obtained
Fig. 2 A comparison of channel advertising efforts using the
awareness share
Fig. 4 A comparison of channel advertising efforts using time
Fig. 5 A comparison of the awareness share for subsidised and
unsubsidised advertising
Fig. 6 A comparison of the players’ payoffs using the awareness
share
Fig. 7 A comparison of channel payoffs using the awareness share
Fig. 3 A comparison of the players’ advertising efforts using time
8 J Ind Eng Int (2017) 13:1–12
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strategies provide information on the extent that the firms
should be involved in advertising. While the retailer should
increase advertising with subsidy, the manufacturer should
reduce advertising since his subsidy to the retailer is an
involvement in advertising. Thus without much spending
on brand name and goodwill (national advertising) his
product can still be successfully sold by subsidising retail
advertising.
The obtained long-run awareness shares inform the
firms of the maximum possible awareness attainable. Thus
it would be needless spending with the aim of exceeding
the maximum level attainable. Any additional spending
after attaining this level would amount to waste since that
level cannot be exceeded.
The knowledge of the subsidy shows that the manu-
facturer should only support advertising when the rate of
increase of his payoff is greater than half the rate of
increase of the retailer’s payoff.
This work has certain limitations. First, we assumed a
bilateral monopolistic situation. This can be extended to a
situation where there is competition between a number of
manufacturers, retailers or both. Secondly, we considered a
situation where the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader.
This work can be extended to consider a situation where the
retailer is powerful enough to influence the manufacturer and
act as the Stackelberg leader. Further, this work can be
extended to consider an integrated channel structure where a
Nash game is played by the manufacturer and the retailer.
Such an extension can be used to compare the channel
structures and determine which channel performs better.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
Appendix 1
Proof of Theorem 3.1





MRy 1k yð Þð ÞaR tð Þ2












Maximizing wrt aR we have




2 1  k yð Þð Þ : ð37Þ



















Using (37) in (4) and (5) we have the HJB equation






























Fig. 8 A comparison of the players’ payoffs using time
Fig. 9 A comparison of channel payoffs using time
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1  kð Þ2þ2k 1  kð Þ








2 1  kð Þ2
¼ 0; ð42Þ
which on simplification leads to (8).
Appendix 2
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Since there is no subsidy we have that k ¼ 0. Thus, (6)
becomes






Putting (36) and k yð Þ ¼ 0 in (38) and (41) we have
















gVM yð Þ ¼ MMyþ
a2VRy V
M













We use the approach of Sethi (1983) and He et al.
(2009) to obtain linear value functions which work for our
model. Thus let
VR yð Þ ¼ HR þ GRy ð46Þ
and
VM yð Þ ¼ HM þ GMy: ð47Þ
These imply that
VMy ¼ GM andVRy ¼ GR: ð48Þ
Using (48) in (43) and (40) we have (9) and (10),
respectively
Putting (46) and (48) into (44) we have
qðHR þ GRyÞ ¼ MRy G
2
Ra
2 1  yð Þ
4
 a
2GRGM 1  yð Þ
2
 GRky:
Equating the coefficients of y and constants, we have
(13) and (15), respectively.
Also, putting (47) and (48) into (45) we have
g HM þ GMyð Þ ¼ MMyþ a
2GRGM 1  yð Þ
2
þ a
2G2M 1  yð Þ
4
 GMky:
Equating the coefficients of y and constants, we have
(14) and (16), respectively.





 0 ) 2VMy  VRy  0 ) 2GM GR:
Appendix 3
Proof of Theorem 4.2
When subsidy is given by the manufacturer, we have that
k[ 0. Now, from (48), we have that (37) becomes
aR yð Þ ¼







Using (8) and (40) in (38) and (41) we have
gVR yð Þ ¼ MRyþ
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VR yð Þ ¼ HR þ GRy; ð52Þ
VM yð Þ ¼ HM þ GMy; ð53Þ
so that
VRy ¼ GR and VMy ¼ GM: ð54Þ
Using (54) in (49) and (40) we have (17) and (18),
respectively.





\1 ) 2VMy  VRy [ 0 and
2VMy  VRy \2VMy  VRy ) 2GM[GR[ 0:
In essence, GR is bounded. It is controlled by market
forces.
Putting (52) and (54) into (50) we have that
8gHR þ 8gGRy ¼ 8MRyþ 2a2GRGM þ a2G2R  2a2GRGMy
 a2G2Ryþ 4a2GRGM  4a2GRGMy
 8GRky:
Equating the coefficients of y and constants, we have
(22) and (24), respectively.
Also putting (53) and (54) into (51), we have that
16gHM þ 16gGMy ¼ 16MMy 4a2G2M þ a2G2R þ 4a2G2My
 a2G2Ryþ 8a2G2M þ 4a2GMGR
 8a2G2My 4a2GMGRyþ 4a2G2M
 4a2G2My 16GMky:
Equating the coefficients of y and constants, we have
(23) and (25), respectively.
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